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Dodge

PORTER V. STATE: APPROPRIATELY PUSHING THE LIMITS OF THE
BATTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME STATUTE
Joy Dodge*
INTRODUCTION
In Porter v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined
whether a woman who employed a hit man to kill her abusive husband
could use the Battered Spouse Syndrome statute to justify a jury
instruction on imperfect self-defense.1 The court held that a woman who
produced evidence that she suffered from Battered Spouse Syndrome
was entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury instruction, even though
she hired a man to kill her husband.2 The court reached the correct
conclusion in this case because it not only recognized the realities of
Battered Spouse Syndrome, but it also aligned with the self-defense
law’s low threshold for raising jury issues.3 The court struck a delicate
balance by avoiding overstepping or creating a new defense to murder
and harmonizing the legislative history, precedent, and self-defense law
into a coherent whole.4 This case note will begin by describing the facts
of the case in Part I,5 followed by a discussion of legal history in Part
II,6 the Maryland Court of Appeals’ analysis in Part III, 7 and an analysis
of the court’s decision in relation to precedent and social science
research in Part IV.8
I. THE CASE
Karla Louise Porter, the petitioner-defendant in this case, was a
long-time sufferer of domestic violence.9 Ms. Porter testified during her
trial that her husband, William Raymond Porter, had inflicted the
following injuries on her:

 2018 Joy Dodge
* J.D. Candidate – May 2019
1
Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017).
2
Id. at 1061.
3
See infra Part IV.
4
Id.
5
See infra Part I.
6
See infra Part II.
7
See infra Part III.
8
See infra Part IV.
9
Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1, 4–5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), rev’d and remanded,
166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017).
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[Mr. Porter had] beaten her on her back and legs with a belt; on
various occasions hit her with a rake, a board, his fists, and a
tool box; stabbed her in the abdomen with a drill; pushed her
head into a grave marker; smeared dog excrement on her;
threatened to kill her on several occasions, at least once while
pointing a gun at her[;] . . . and forced her to stand at their
kitchen sink and drink water until she urinated on herself.”10
Moreover, about a week before her husband passed away, Ms. Porter’s
husband allegedly “held a gun to Ms. Porter’s head . . . [and said] ‘I
should just kill you now.’”11 Also within the week of his death, Mr.
Porter hit Ms. Porter across her back with a crutch when she failed to
sympathize with his boredom.12 Throughout her marriage, which began
in 1986, Ms. Porter suffered abuse at the hands of her husband.13 Ms.
Porter testified at trial that she “knew it was a matter of time before he
killed [her].”14
From June 2009 to January 2010, Ms. Porter tried
unsuccessfully to solicit someone to kill her husband for her.15
Eventually, Ms. Porter’s nephew introduced her to Walter Bishop, who
volunteered to kill her husband after hearing about the abuse she
endured.16 The evening before her husband’s death, Ms. Porter called
Mr. Bishop.17 Mr. Bishop agreed to shoot Mr. Porter at the gas station
that the Porter’s owned the following morning.18 On March 1, 2010, Mr.
Bishop shot Mr. Porter and staged the incident to look like a robbery.19
Ms. Porter was arrested on March 6, after one of the previous people

10

Id.
Id. at 5.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 4.
14
Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1, 5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 166
A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017).
15
Id. at 6
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 6–7. Ms. Porter called Mr. Bishop and her brother, who was driving Bishop
to the gas station, over fifty times before the shooting.
19
Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1, 7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 166
A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017).
11
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she solicited to kill her husband called the police.20 Ms. Porter
eventually confessed that she hired Mr. Bishop to beat up her husband.21
At trial, Dr. Neal Blumberg, an expert witness, testified that in
the year before her husband’s death, Ms. Porter “became increasingly
anxious and fearful for her life and safety,” “felt . . . helpless to extricate
herself,” and suffered from Battered Spouse Syndrome,22 as defined in
Section 10–916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.23
The jury received instruction on imperfect self-defense. The jury
was, in part, told that
[i]f the Defendant actually believed that she was in immediate
danger of death or serious bodily harm, even though a
reasonable person would not have so believed, and the
Defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to
defend herself in light of the threatened or actual force, and that
retreat from the threat was unsafe, and that she was not the
aggressor, the Defendant’s actual, though unreasonable belief,
is a partial self-defense and the verdict should be guilty of
voluntary manslaughter rather than murder.24
The jury found Ms. Porter guilty of “murder in the first degree, use of
a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, conspiracy to
20

Id.
Id. at 7.
22
Id. at 8–9.
23
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916(b) (West 2018) (“Notwithstanding
evidence that the defendant was the first aggressor, used excessive force, or failed to
retreat at the time of the alleged offense, when the defendant raises the issue that the
defendant was, at the time of the alleged offense, suffering from the Battered Spouse
Syndrome as a result of the past course of conduct of the individual who is the
victim of the crime for which the defendant has been charged, the court may admit
for the purpose of explaining the defendant's motive or state of mind, or both, at the
time of the commission of the alleged offense: (1) Evidence of repeated physical and
psychological abuse of the defendant perpetrated by an individual who is the victim
of a crime for which the defendant has been charged; and (2) Expert testimony on
the Battered Spouse Syndrome.”).
24
Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1, 17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), rev’d and remanded,
166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017).
21
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commit murder in the first degree, and three counts of solicitation to
commit murder.”25
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that,
although the jury instruction had erroneously stated that retreat had to
be unsafe and the defendant could not have been the aggressor to find
imperfect self-defense, the court nevertheless found that this was a
harmless error, since Ms. Porter was not eligible for the imperfect selfdefense instruction.26 The court noted that, in order to be entitled to an
imperfect self-defense instruction, the defendant must have “honestly,
albeit subjectively, believed that she was in imminent, that is to say,
immediate, danger of death or serious bodily harm.”27 Moreover,
Battered Spouse Syndrome can be used to “‘support both the subjective
honesty of the defendant’s perception of imminent harm and the
objective reasonableness of such a perception.’”28 The court reasoned
that, although there was evidence of imminent fear in the weeks prior to
Mr. Porter’s death, there was a lack of evidence of Ms. Porter’s fear of
imminent danger “at the time that Mr. Porter was shot[; thus,] there was
insufficient evidence to generate a jury instruction on self-defense.”29
Judge Friedman dissented.30 Judge Friedman pointed out that
the “some evidence”31 standard to raise a jury issue can be satisfied even
with the introduction of only “the uncorroborated testimony of the
defendant.”32 Moreover, Judge Friedman cited Wright v. State,33 which
stated that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction even if the defense
is “well-nigh incredible as a matter of fact.”34 Judge Friedman also
argued that the question of imminence is not for the judge to decide.35
25

Id. at 11.
Id. at 24.
27
Id. (citing State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (Md. 1984)).
28
Id. at 22 (quoting State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 439 (Md. 2004)).
29
Porter v. State, 148 A.3d 1, 24 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), rev’d and remanded,
166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017).
30
Id. at 24.
31
Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017).
32
Id. at 34 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (citing Arthur v. State, 24 A.3d 667, 675 (Md.
2011)).
33
Id. (citing Wright v. State, 522 A.2d 401 (Md. 1987)).
34
Wright, 522 A.2d at 402 (citing Howell v. State, 468 A.2d 688, 691 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1983)).
35
Porter, 148 A.3d at 35 (citing State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429 (Md. 2004)).
26
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Thus, Judge Friedman believed that Ms. Porter established a pattern of
abuse and should be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.36 Lastly,
Judge Friedman argued that the use of a contract killer is not relevant,
in the absence of the statute specifically stating that its scope is limited
to certain types of homicides.37
The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari on the question
of whether the trial court’s erroneous instruction on imperfect selfdefense constitutes harmless error.38
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Self-Defense in General
State v. Faulkner39 set forth the difference between perfect selfdefense and imperfect self-defense in Maryland:
Perfect self-defense requires not only that the killer subjectively
believed that his actions were necessary for his safety but,
objectively, that a reasonable man would so consider them.
Imperfect self-defense, however, requires no more than a
subjective honest belief on the part of the killer that his actions
were necessary for his safety, even though, on an objective
appraisal by a reasonable man, they would not be found to be
so. If established, the killer remains culpable and his actions are
excused only to the extent that mitigation is invoked.40
A claim of imperfect self-defense negates malice, the mens rea element
of murder.41 Imperfect self-defense is not a complete defense; rather, a
successful claim merely mitigates a murder charge to manslaughter.42
When a defendant presents evidence of a subjective belief that the force
used was necessary to prevent imminent danger, the court noted that
36

Id. at 34.
Id. at 36.
38
Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017).
39
State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759 (Md. 1984).
40
Id. at 768–69 (quoting Faulkner v. State, 458 A.2d 81, 82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1983)).
41
Id. at 761.
42
Id.
37
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“the defendant is entitled to a proper instruction on imperfect selfdefense.”43
State v. Marr reaffirmed State v. Faulkner’s explanation of selfdefense.44 Marr noted that imperfect self-defense involves the
defendant actually believing that she is in “apparent imminent danger
of death or serious bodily harm from the assailant, requiring the use of
deadly force,” but does not require an objectively reasonable belief.45
What the defendant unreasonably, but actually believes may be “the
perception of imminent danger or the belief that the force employed is
necessary to meet the danger.”46 A defendant whose acts meet this
definition of imperfect self-defense “does not act with malice” and thus
cannot be guilty of murder, but rather manslaughter.47
Wilson v. State further clarified the requirements for asserting
imperfect self-defense in Maryland.48 The court quoted Dykes v. State
and made clear that the defendant need only produce “some evidence”
on the issue of self-defense to create a jury issue.49 “Some evidence”
need not rise to a preponderance of the evidence standard.50 Moreover,
“[t]he source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from
the defendant” and may be “overwhelmed by evidence to the
contrary.”51 The court made clear that “[i]f there is any evidence relied
on by the defendant which, if believed would support his claim that he
acted in self-defense, the defendant has met his burden.”52 The court
emphasized that it was up to the jury to evaluate the defendant’s
trustworthiness, and that it was not appropriate for the court to weigh
the veracity of the defendant’s statements, even when the defendant’s
statements were “overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary.”53

43

Id. at 769.
State v. Marr, 765 A.2d 645 (Md. 2001).
45
Id. at 648.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Wilson v. State, 30 A.3d 955 (Md. 2011).
49
Id. at 960 (quoting Dykes v. State, 571 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Md. 1990)).
50
Id. (quoting Dykes, 571 A.2d at 1257).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Wilson, 30 A.3d at 960.
44
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B. Battered Spouse Syndrome
Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article sets forth the Battered Spouse or Battered Woman’s Syndrome
Statute, which was signed into law in 1991.54 In part, Section 10-916 of
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states that:
Notwithstanding evidence that the defendant was the first
aggressor, used excessive force, or failed to retreat at the time of
the alleged offense, when the defendant raises the issue that the
defendant was, at the time of the alleged offense, suffering from
the Battered Spouse Syndrome as a result of the past course of
conduct of the individual who is the victim of the crime for
which the defendant has been charged, the court may admit for
the purpose of explaining the defendant’s motive or state of
mind, or both, at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense: (1) Evidence of repeated physical and psychological
abuse of the defendant perpetrated by an individual who is the
victim of a crime for which the defendant has been charged; and
(2) Expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome.55
The Senate Judicial Proceedings Floor Report on House Bill 49,
which became Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article stated, after a discussion of the difference between
perfect and imperfect self-defense, that “[t]his bill would clarify that the
court has discretion to admit evidence of repeated physical and
psychological abuse of the defendant by the alleged victim and expert
testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome.”56 The Floor Report also
articulated the appropriate standard that the legislature foresaw being
used under this statute.57 It made clear that Section 10-916 of the
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article was originally
intended to be discretionary.

54

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10–916 (West 2018).
Id.
56
S. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMM., FLOOR REP. H.B. 49, 401st Sess., at 2 (Md.
1991).
57
Id.
55
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Included in the bill file for House Bill 49 is a letter from House
of Ruth Attorney Judith A. Wolfer.58 She stated that “[e]xpert testimony
is crucial to help explain how a battered spouse becomes an expert in
anticipating her partner’s abuse, why she was unable to leave the
battering situation, why she perceived herself to be in imminent harm
that moment, and why her action appeared to be the only viable choice
left to her.”59 Moreover, Wolfer dispelled several myths about the law,
including: that the bill requires the court to admit evidence in every case,
that this is a license to kill, that Battered Spouse Syndrome is not
commonly accepted in the medical and legal community, and that
Battered Spouse Syndrome will become a new defense to murder.60 The
letter also made clear that this “bill only ensures a fair trial, not an
acquittal.”61
Banks v. State62 is a case about hearsay, but it was the first case
to comment on Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article. Banks v. State provided that Section 10-916 of the
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is not a new defense
to murder.63 Rather, Battered Spouse Syndrome “is offered to prove the
honesty and reasonableness of the defendant's belief that he or she was
in imminent danger at the time of the offense.”64
In State v. Smullen, the Maryland Court of Appeals shed light
on the Battered Spouse Syndrome statute.65 The court reasoned that

58

Letter from Judith A. Wolfer, House of Ruth, to House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 27,
1991) (on file with the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
Thurgood Marshall Law Library). The House of Ruth is an organization founded in
1977 to provide a safe haven for victims of domestic violence and their children.
About House of Ruth, HOUSE OF RUTH MD., http://www.hruth.org/about-us/ (last
visited Apr. 12, 2018).
59
Letter from Judith A. Wolfer, House of Ruth, to House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 27,
1991) (on file with the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
Thurgood Marshall Law Library).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
608 A.2d 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
63
Id. at 1253.
64
Id.
65
844 A.2d 429, 449–51(Md. 2004) (holding that, although battered child syndrome
is within the purview of Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial
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evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome explains, “why and how, in light
of that pattern of abuse, the defendant could honestly, and perhaps
reasonably, perceive an imminent threat of immediate danger.”66 The
statute provides for a “more careful and sophisticated look at the notion
of imminent threat” and recognizes “that certain conduct that might not
be regarded as imminently dangerous by the public at large can cause
someone who has been repeatedly subjected to and hurt by that conduct
before to honestly, even if unreasonably, regard it as imminently
threatening.”67 The court explained in a footnote that Section 10-916 of
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is not in actuality
discretionary:
[i]f, because an adequate foundation for it has been established,
syndrome evidence is relevant and is properly offered, the court
must admit it, first, because Maryland Rule 5-402 makes clear
that, unless rendered admissible by other law, all relevant
evidence is admissible, and second, because a defendant has a
Due Process Constitutional right to . . . have considered relevant
and admissible evidence in support of . . . [her] defense.68
The court cautioned, however, that Battered Spouse Syndrome is not
intended to become an independent defense to murder.69 For example,
the defendant in State v. Smullen was not entitled to a jury instruction
on imperfect self-defense because he only testified to unclear events of
abuse that did not cause serious injury or attract the notice of third
parties.70 Absent the defendant providing an evidentiary basis to support
a claim of imperfect self-defense, the court cautioned that Section 10916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article would
become an independent defense to murder.71
In State v. Peterson, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
reviewed a case where the trial court declined an imperfect self-defense
Proceedings Article, Mr. Smullen did not present evidence of repeated physical
abuse sufficient to be entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury instruction).
66
Id. at 453.
67
Id. at 439.
68
Id. at 445 n.8.
69
Id. at 439.
70
Smullen, 844 A.2d at 453.
71
Id.

Dodge

244

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 18:1

jury instruction in a case of non-confrontational homicide.72 Although
an expert witness testified that the victim in the case believed that she
was in imminent danger when she shot her husband, the expert witness
was not asked about Battered Spouse Syndrome in particular.73 The
court held that there was sufficient evidence of abuse, including
corroboration from the victim’s son, such that the victim should have
been afforded expert testimony on Battered Spouse Syndrome.74 The
court held that the failure to introduce evidence of Battered Spouse
Syndrome was ineffective assistance of counsel because “[i]t is
reasonably probable” that had the evidence been introduced, “the result
of the proceeding would have been different.”75
C. Third-Party Assisted Homicide and Battered Spouse
Syndrome in Other Jurisdictions
No Maryland court prior to Porter has dealt with the interplay
between self-defense law and contract killings in the context of
domestic violence.76 However, other jurisdictions have addressed this
issue. In People v. Yaklich,77 the Colorado Court of Appeals held “that
a self-defense instruction is not available in a contract-for-hire situation,
even though the accused presents credible evidence that she is a victim
of the battered woman syndrome.”78 The court rested its decision on the
fact that, in Colorado, Battered Spouse Syndrome is not a defense to
murder, rather, it can merely be considered in the self-defense context.79
The defendant in this case could not prove imminent danger to be
entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.80 The court decided that
allowing Battered Spouse Syndrome to become a defense to murder in
contract killings would undermine self-defense law and contravene
72

State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
Id. In addition to being physically abused, Ms. Peterson’s husband made clear that
his threats to kill her were “promises.” Id. at 1137.
74
Id. at 1151–52.
75
Id. at 1154.
76
Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044, 1062 (Md. 2017) (“We acknowledge that three
other jurisdictions faced with this question have declined to allow a self-defense jury
instruction when a woman hires a third party to kill her abusive partner.”).
77
833 P.2d 758 (Colo. 1991).
78
Id. at 760.
79
Id. at 761.
80
Id. at 763 (noting that the defendant planned her husband’s death over an eightmonth period).
73
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public policy to allow the defendant to escape punishment while letting
the hired killer face a murder conviction.81
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee at Nashville in
State v. Leaphart82 held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury
instruction on self-defense, where she could not prove imminent fear at
the time of the killing.83 Tennessee law defines imminent fear as fear
“at the time of the killing” and the defendant could not meet this
threshold.84
In State v. Anderson,85 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that
the trial court properly excluded evidence that the defendant suffered
from Battered Spouse Syndrome. Missouri has a statute dealing with
Battered Spouse Syndrome,86 but the statute requires that self-defense
already be independently established in the case before admitting
evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome.87 The defendant in this case
could not establish imminent fear, where she planned her husband’s
homicide for three months; thus, she was not entitled to a self-defense
jury instruction.88
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
The Maryland Court of Appeals began its analysis in the Porter case
by discussing the law of self-defense.89 Judge Adkins, writing for the
majority, noted that, according to State v. Smullen, imperfect selfdefense merely requires a showing that the defendant actually believed
she was in danger, no matter whether or not the belief was reasonable.90
Moreover, the court explained that the defendant need only show that

81

Id.
673 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
83
Id. at 873.
84
Id. (quoting State v. Wilson, 556 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tenn. 1977)).
85
785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
86
MO. REV. STAT. § 563.033 (2017)).
87
Anderson, 785 S.W.2d at 600.
88
Id.
89
Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044, 1053 (Md. 2017).
90
Id. (citing State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 439 (Md. 2004)).
82
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she actually believed that retreat was unsafe and the “force used was
necessary.”91
The court then engaged in an extensive discussion of Battered
Spouse Syndrome.92 It explained that domestic violence is pervasive
and that nearly half of murdered women were killed by an intimate
partner.93 The court quoted Dr. Lenore Walker’s findings that
“[b]attered spouse syndrome is characterized by two main phenomena:
a cycle of intimate partner violence and the development of ‘learned
helplessness.’”94 The court then connected Battered Spouse Syndrome
to imperfect self-defense.95 Specifically, the court stated that the
testimony of experts as to how Battered Spouse Syndrome influences a
woman’s decision to use force against her abuser is vital for self-defense
claims.96 The expert testimony can explain both why the woman did not
leave her abuser and how seemingly innocuous events could be
perceived as threatening to a woman undergoing repeated cycles of
abuse.97
The opinion then returned to a discussion of self-defense in
general.98 To be entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense, the
defendant need only produce “‘some evidence.’”99 Moreover, the court,
after examining cases from other states, clarified that the defendant need
only show that she feared imminent or immediate death or serious
bodily harm, “not both.”100 The court noted that, in order to avoid
redundancy in the definition of imperfect self-defense, the two words
91

Porter, 166 A.3d at 1053 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1054–55. The Court noted that the majority of the victims of intimate partner
violence are women and that about one in four women will experience intimate
partner violence at some point. Id. at 1054.
93
Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 236018, HOMICIDE
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1980–2008, at 18 (2011),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf).
94
Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044, 1054 (Md. 2017) (quoting Lenore E. A. Walker,
Battered Women Syndrome and Self–Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 321, 330 (1992)).
95
Id. at 1054–55.
96
Id.
97
Id. (citing State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 451 (Md. 2004)).
98
Id. at 1055–56.
99
Porter, 166 A.3d at 1056 (quoting Wilson v. State, 30 A.3d, 955, 960 (Md. 2011)).
100
Id. at 1059.
92
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cannot be defined synonymously.101 The court made clear that “an
imminent threat is not dependent on its temporal proximity to the
defensive act.”102
Furthermore, connecting self-defense to Battered Spouse
Syndrome, the court opined that “[i]f we were to hold that a battered
spouse who kills in a non-confrontational setting is not entitled to a selfdefense instruction, we would render all or some of the evidence
admissible under the Battered Spouse Syndrome statute irrelevant.”103
Moreover, absent a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense, entering
evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome “would be pointless.”104
Entering evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome is imperative to
preserving a claim of imperfect self-defense.105 In the case of nonconfrontational homicides, providing expert testimony about how an
abused “woman might actually fear imminent danger during a break
between violent episodes” can help a jury understand the situation.106
The court not only pointed out that Ms. Porter presented evidence that
she feared imminent danger, but also noted that “[i]n a cyclical, abusive
relationship the threatened violence will come to fruition – it is often
only a matter of when.”107
The Maryland Court of Appeals allowed Ms. Porter to claim
imperfect self-defense, holding that a woman who suffers from Battered
Spouse Syndrome need not be abused within “hours of her defensive
action to be entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-defense.”108
Acknowledging that extending the definition of imminence recognizes
“the reality of intimate partner violence,” the court also noted that
101

Id.
Id.
103
Id.
104
Porter, 166 A.3d at 1059.
105
Id.
106
Id. Research indicates that, in the case of non-confrontational homicides, during
the cycle of violence, a woman’s fear of being “unable to defend herself when the
next attack comes” builds and so she “finally ‘defends’ herself at her only
opportunity [] during a lull in the violence.’” Id. (quoting David L. Faigman and
Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 67, 73 (1997) (footnotes omitted)).
107
Id. at 1061.
108
Id.
102
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“[i]mperfect self-defense negates the element of malice, not
premeditation.”109 The court highlighted that “[t]he means by which a
woman takes defensive action against her abuser does not affect
whether she actually believed she was in imminent danger at the time
of the killing.”110 Thus, even a woman who hired a hit man can claim
imperfect-self-defense.111 The court acknowledged that its decision was
not in line with holdings from three other jurisdictions that have
addressed this question, but pointed out that none of the other states
had a statute that allowed evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome to
support a claim of imperfect self-defense.112 Moreover, Missouri, the
only state with a battered spouse statute that addressed this question,
only allowed its use in cases of perfect self-defense, rather than
imperfect self-defense.113 The opinion also boldly stated that contract
killings should not be treated differently from other non-confrontational
killings, with or without a Battered Spouse Syndrome statute.114
Judge Greene dissented, arguing that planned killings cannot be
in response to an imminent threat.115 The majority criticized Judge
Greene’s dissent for showing a lack of understanding of the realities of
domestic violence.116 Namely, the majority rebuked the notion that a
threat must be contemporaneous with the defensive action for the victim
to be entitled to a claim of imperfect self-defense.117 The majority
opinion states that the dissent improperly conflates reasonable fear and
actual fear.118 The court then explained that Ms. Porter satisfied the
“some evidence” requirement for being entitled to an imperfect selfdefense jury instruction.119 The evidence that Ms. Porter feared
109
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imminent danger on the day her husband was killed included Ms.
Porter’s testimony that in the month before his death, Mr. Porter
threatened to kill Ms. Porter while pointing a gun at her head and that
Ms. Porter “knew he was going to kill [her] at any point.”120 Thus,
despite using a third party to kill her husband, the court held that Ms.
Porter was entitled to a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense.121
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Porter v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a
woman who had produced evidence that she suffered from Battered
Spouse Syndrome was entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury
instruction even though she hired a man to kill her husband.122 The
Maryland Court of Appeals made the correct decision in Porter. The
court harmonized social science research, the legislative history of
Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article, precedent, and self-defense law into a coherent whole, while
avoiding creating a new defense to murder. Porter expanded the Section
10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
precedent to allow Battered Spouse Syndrome evidence to be used to
explain imminent fear in imperfect self-defense, even when the woman
hired a hitman.123 Although the court went further than prior court
decisions on Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, the court’s reasoning is squarely in line with selfdefense precedent that calls for a low threshold for evidence required to
generate a jury instruction.124 Allowing this defense in hired gun cases,
although stretching the statute to the limit and exceeding legislative
intent, recognizes the realities of Battered Spouse Syndrome, while still
respecting stare decisis. The court’s decision remained within the
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bounds of precedent, but expanded the doctrine to reflect societal
realities, as many courts have done before.125
The language of Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article and the Senate Floor Report on House Bill
49 is unambiguous; the entry of Battered Spouse Syndrome evidence
was originally designed to be discretionary.126 Moreover, Section 10916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article was never
designed to be a new defense to murder.127 However, Section 10-916 of
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is a recognition
that evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome is relevant to the issue of
self-defense.128 Since Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article makes clear that evidence related to
Battered Spouse Syndrome is relevant, the reality is that judges do not
actually have the discretion to admit this evidence. As the Court of
Appeals in State v. Smullen noted and Porter v. State recognized in
making its decision, Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article must be considered in concert with other Maryland
law.129 The result is that the court must admit evidence of Battered
Spouse Syndrome because the court is required to admit relevant
evidence under Maryland Rule 5-402, minus a few well-defined
exceptions.130 Moreover, since the evidence is relevant and must be
admitted, once the evidence is presented, it follows that the jury must
receive an instruction on the issue. Recognizing long-standing selfdefense law, the Maryland Court of Appeals correctly emphasized the
fact that the defendant need only produce some evidence going to the
issue of self-defense to be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.131
125
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Thus, based on the law of evidence and self-defense, the court correctly
decided to require a jury instruction on the issue of self-defense in Ms.
Porter’s case, where at least some evidence of Battered Spouse
Syndrome was introduced at trial.132
The Maryland Court of Appeals correctly applied Section 10916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to nonconfrontational homicide, comporting with both legislative history and
precedent.133 The Senate Floor Report on House Bill 49, as well as State
v. Peterson and State v. Smullen acknowledged that Section 10-916 of
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article applies equally to
cases of confrontational and non-confrontational homicides.134 The
Maryland Court of Appeals, however, expanded this line of reasoning
beyond the traditional non-confrontational homicide, where the abused
spouse is the one who commits the homicide, to one where the abused
spouse hires a hit man. The court argued that it did not matter how the
defensive action was taken, rather, it is imminent fear that matters.135 It
is evident from the Judith A. Wolfer’s letter that neither the legislature
nor the court in Banks v. State or State v. Smullen intended Section 10916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to be
stretched so far that it would become a new defense to murder.136
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals in Porter recognized that it was
expanding the definition of imminence, so that abuse no longer had to
occur within hours of the homicide.137
Only those who suffer from Battered Spouse Syndrome can use
Section 10-916 to mitigate a charge of murder to manslaughter. This
does not, however, mean that people who truly suffer from Battered
Spouse Syndrome should be barred from using Section 10-916 of the
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Thus, Ms. Porter,
132
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who demonstrated that she was a genuine sufferer of Battered Spouse
Syndrome could use Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article.138 Moreover, Section 10-916 of the
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, does not expressly
limit the manner in which defensive action can be taken.139 The fact that
Ms. Porter planned her method of self-defense does not automatically
preclude an argument that she experienced “imminent fear.”140
Furthermore, Porter was correct in its decision because the court
took into account the realities of Battered Spouse Syndrome.141 Battered
Spouse Syndrome has been characterized in the past by a cycle of
violence including tension building, battering, and calm phases.142
While it has since been shown that not all women experience every
phase in the cycle of abuse, “many battered women experience a
psychological battering, a wearing down and wearing away of the
spirit.”143 Battered Spouse Syndrome was also characterized by learned
helplessness, according to Dr. Lenore Walker.144 Learned helplessness
suggested that “women believe that they lack all control over their
abusive situation and feel it is impossible to escape” resulting in the
woman becoming “increasingly passive.”145
The term “learned helplessness” has also been criticized in
recent scholarship.146 The belief is now that abused women who kill
their abusive partners do so “when they have no other alternative”
because “they have been prevented from leaving” and it is now “kill-or-
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be-killed.”147 This new scholarship actually better supports the
argument underlying the Battered Spouse Syndrome defense than the
prior learned helplessness framework. For example, it is believed that a
woman may react during a lull in the violence because she is physically
incapable of successfully fighting back unless her partner is
incapacitated.148 Moreover, leaving an abusive relationship is not
always an option, as it is the most dangerous time in the relationship.149
This helps explain why, instead of leaving, some women resort to
violence. By allowing Ms. Porter to use the Battered Spouse Syndrome
defense in this case, the court, although using outdated language,
recognized that domestic violence can lead women to choose violence
during a period of calm as a means of extricating herself from her
abusive situation.150
Moreover, the court’s decision is in line with Battered Spouse
Syndrome and its relation to imminence.151 Battered Spouse Syndrome
helps explain the actual imminence experienced by these women, even
when there is no abuse occurring at the moment, as “battered women
are more sensitive than the non-battered woman in perceiving the
imminent danger to which they respond.”152 Evidence suggests that in
times of stress, women are more likely to draw on social support.153
Thus, the Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision to allow battered
women to use Section 10-916 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article even when they employ hit men recognized the
realities of domestic violence and the help-seeking that may follow
victimization. With this psychological background in mind, it is evident
that a woman may ask for help in dealing with her abusive situation in
a way that would not jeopardize her safety, as leaving an abusive
relationship is incredibly dangerous.154 Moreover, the Maryland Court
of Appeals’ decision acknowledges the social science research
surrounding the influence of Battered Spouse Syndrome on imminence
and expanded the legal definition to comport with the realities of the
147
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syndrome.155 Thus, the court’s decision recognizes that, in order to have
an effective Battered Spouse Syndrome statute, it must take into account
how the syndrome actually presents itself in real life.
CONCLUSION
In Porter v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a woman who
had produced evidence that she suffered from Battered Spouse
Syndrome was entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury instruction,
even though she hired a man to kill her husband.156 The court reached
the correct conclusion in this case because it not only recognized the
realities of Battered Spouse Syndrome, but its decision also aligned with
self-defense law’s low threshold for raising jury issues.157 The court
harmonized social science research with the legislative history,
precedent, and self-defense law of the State.158
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